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Abstract 
Many examples of information processing distortion during the process of diagnosis may be found in cognitive literature. 
Many of preferred psychologists’ cognitive strategies limit reliability of their diagnosis. The research question was 'what is 
related to heuristic strategies?’ The purpose of the study was to examine the relationships between psychologists’ cognitive 
preferences (such as: type of mind, need for cognitive closure), clinical experience and strategies used in assessment. Case 
Study – Simulation was the main instrument used in this investigation. Three strategies were identified during the research 
process: maximal strategy, heuristic strategy, mixed strategy. The main hypothesis of this research was confirmed – 
diagnostic strategy is connected to cognitive orientation. The results of this study have practical implications for education 
in diagnosis, especially clinical diagnosis, in two areas: students of psychology education and further education 
(professional development) of psychologists.  
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1. Introduction 
 Assessment generally consists in intellectual information processing. Psychological assessment is a decision 
making process, which consists in active searching of data essential for determining the activities needed to 
transform the existing state or situation (Elstein, Schwarz, 2005). The acceptance of this perspective allows us to use 
the theory of cognitive psychology, i.a. the decision theory. Many examples of information processing distortion 
during the diagnosis process may be found in cognitive literature (Rabinowitz, Efron, 1997). Many cognitive 
strategies employed by psychologists limit the reliability of their diagnosis. For instance, they tend to see 
abnormalities where they do not exist. Sometimes they tend to ignore a part of diagnostic data at the same time 
overestimating another. However, not all diagnosticians equally follow cognitive inclinations (Nosal, 1995). The 
Influence of individual differences (i.a. possessed knowledge, experience, mind type) can also explain the lack of 
agreement between clinicians in regard to a given patient’s state of mental health (Paluchowski, 1991, Nosal, 1995). 
2. Diagnostic information processing strategies 
Referring to the heuristic – systematic model of information processing of Chen, Shechter and Chaiken 
(1996, in Brycz, 2004) it can be assumed that a diagnostician has two possible styles of data processing: 1) heuristic, 
which lies in problem solving and deciding about a diagnosis on the basis of simple decision rules (non-specific and 
specific – diagnostic); 2) systematic, meaning systematic, comparative analysis of information crucial for solving a 
problem and making diagnostic decisions. In case of the first strategy, the effort connected to information processing 
is minimised but at the expense of reducing subjective opinion confidence or even of decreasing the diagnosis' 
relevance. The other strategy is connected to maximum cognitive effort but at the same time it maximises subjective 
opinion confidence and it may even increase the diagnosis' relevance. The process of solving problems using the 
way of systematic generation of hypothesis is generally much longer than the process where many different 
heuristics are used. 
Professional diagnosticians probably use both information processing strategies – heuristic and analytic, but 
the frequency of using each probably depends on the variable values connected to the subject (i.e. experience, 
cognitive preferences) and connected to the situation (i.e. how complex and typical the diagnosed case is, time 
pressure). I concentrate mostly on the subject factors without considering external determinants, however, being 
aware of their impact on the diagnostic process. 
3. Current Study 
The aim of this study was to define the relation between individual qualities of psychologists’ mind and 
diagnosis strategy. Two complex theoretical constructs relating to cognitive preferences are elements of the 
preferred and used diagnosis strategy – mind type and need for cognitive closure as well as professional experience. 
Another aim of this study was to find out if the type of diagnosis strategy (analytic versus heuristic) differentiates 
diagnostic accuracy. It can be supposed that using heuristic diagnostic strategies will decrease the diagnostic 
accuracy because of the probability of mistakes related to using heuristic rules (in Chapman, Aubin, 2002; 
Rabinowitz, Efron, 1997). 
3.1. Participants 
The research was carried out on a group of 60 people (57 women and 3 men), psychologists working in 
different fields of clinical psychology (mental health advising, psychotherapy, clinical diagnosis of patients in 
mental hospitals). The participants were aged between 25 and 57 with an average of 35,77; standard deviation 8,81. 
The minimum professional experience was half a year, maximum – 35 years; with an average of 10,64, standard 
deviation 9,23 years. The research was conducted at psychologists' workplaces. The researcher met the 
psychologists individually; the length of the meetings varied from half an hour to 1,5 hour. 
3.2. Measures 
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Case analysis – simulation (CA-S). The clinical description includes qualities characteristic for schizoid 
personality disorder on the basis of the International Classification of Diseases ICD-10. The research participants' 
task was to formulate a nosological diagnosis. The instruction is a modified version of the one from Clinical 
Treatment Planning Simulations – CTPS (Falvey, Hebert, 1992; Falvey, 2001; Falvey i in., 2005) and it is based on 
the technique of loud thinking. The method was used to define the diagnostic strategy. Two main strategies were 
classified: 1) the analytic strategy – maximizing the data (based on a big amount of diagnostic data) and generating 
many new diagnostic hypotheses as well as using heuristic rules; it has an affirmative character (searching for 
confirmation of already gathered information); 2) the heuristic strategy – data minimizing (based on a small amount 
of diagnostic data) and generating a small number of diagnostic hypotheses as well as using classic heuristic rules; 
its aim is to falsify the hypothesis and to avoid an affirmation mistake. This method was used also to define the 
accuracy of the diagnosis formulated in the scope of the Case Analysis – Simulation (CA-S) task. The criterion was 
based on opinions of clinical psychology experts. 
Mind Type Scale (STU). The differences between cognitive preferences were operationalized by means of 
the adjective scale (Nosal, 1992), based on Jung's theory (1921/1997). The Mind type was defined as general 
cognitive preferences for the type of the received information and methods of its collection, determined by one of 
the functions (perception versus intuition) and the information assessment method and decision making (rational 
versus emotional). This scale was verified using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator – MBTI, and it obtained good 
psychometric indicators. 
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (SPDP). The scale is used to measure relatively constant individual 
differences in the scope of a particular type of cognitive motivation (Kruglanski and others, 1993, in Jaworski, 1998; 
Webster, 1993). The Need for cognitive closure was defined as the preference of experiences (activities) favouring 
situation cognitive closure, which is shown by aiming at creating an unambiguous structure of knowledge. In this 
study, the Polish adaptation of Need for Cognitive Closure Scale was used (Jaworski, 1998). 
3.3. Statistical Analyses and Outcomes 
The analysis was conducted in a few phases. First, the qualitative data was coded by competent judges. After 
establishing consistence between among the coding persons, the data reduction was started. To achieve it, the 
quantitative indicators were calculated and the independent criteria were defined. Next, all the data, from all the 
methods were statistically analysed. 
The basis of for generating the indicators of diagnostic information processing strategy was the data2 from 
the Case Analysis – Simulation (CA-S) method. Each case (each examined person's statement) was coded by 3 
persons (students of psychology). The competent judges' task was to determine to which semantic category do 
particular text units – the statements of psychologists participating in the research - belong. 
By means of cluster analysis (k-mean procedure) the diagnostic strategies were defined. As a result, there 
were found 3 different clusters representing persons with different diagnostic strategies, in this way creating three 
profiles of diagnostic strategies. Next, in order to asses the classification accuracy and the objects' affiliation with 
particular clusters, the discriminant analysis was conducted and the affiliation of a few examined persons was 
corrected. On the basis of the results of the cluster analysis as well as the discriminant analysis, profiles of cluster 
affiliation were created. 
The strategies of diagnostic data processing were the basis for diagnosticians’ typology (3 types). The 
hypothesis concerning the relation between independent variables (mind type, need for cognitive closure) and the 
dependent variable (diagnostic strategies) were verified to characterize the diagnosticians’ types. 
The hypothesis concerning mind type as a factor that differentiates the diagnostic strategy was verified. The 
hypothesis was partially confirmed. The results of one-way ANOVA analysis showed that there are significant 
differences between aversion to thinking and feeling and preferred diagnostic strategies (1 and 2). People using the 
maximizing diagnostic strategy (type 1) tend to have an aversion to feeling (contrasted with thinking); F = 4,09; p = 
0,022. People using the heuristic diagnostic strategy (type 2) tend to have an aversion to thinking (contrasted with 
feeling); F = 4,097; p = 0,022. Significant differences were also found between aversion to the functions pair 
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intuition-thinking (contrasted with sensing-feeling) and diagnostic strategies (1 and 2). The Aversions to 
”intellectual intuition” are connected to using the heuristic diagnostic strategy and the smaller aversions to using the 
analytic strategy; F = 3,257; p = 0,003. In addition, the results of the t-test for independent samples confirmed that 
the diagnostic strategy of maximizing is connected to cognitive orientation on analytic information processing 
(dominant function: perception) and that the heuristic strategy is connected to cognitive orientation on global 
information processing (dominant function: intuition); t (31) = 1,979; p = 0,05. The results can indicate that the task 
for the examined psychologists activated the more general preferences in the scope of information processing.  
The factor that does not differentiate the diagnostic strategies is the need for cognitive closure (ANOVA; F = 
0,195; p > 0,05). These results do not confirm the theory. The hypothesis concerning professional experience as a 
factor differentiating diagnostic strategy was examined. This factor did not differentiate the diagnostic strategies 
(ANOVA; F = 0,119; p > 0,05). Moreover, the research did not confirm the hypothesis concerning the dependence 
of diagnosis accuracy on diagnostic strategy (Chi2  = 3,73; p = 0,15). 
The results shown above and additional statistic analysis allow for characterising diagnosticians' types more 
precisely. 
Type 1. The First group consisted of the persons (N = 6, that is 10 percent) who analyse much information 
and formulate many diagnostic hypotheses. This group can be described as the ”maximizing group”. This group 
considered premises about the examined persons' activities rather than their life and the subject history. More 
emphasis was put on context than on subjective factors, in contrast to the nosological model of diagnosis, based on 
data about a given person. Among the hypotheses, there are significantly more positively formulated than rejected 
ones. Also, more hypotheses concerning the system rather than emotions and behaviour of examined persons' or 
their qualities (disposition) appeared during the research. 
This type of diagnostician prefers analytic information processing and organizing, searching for details 
(functions: perception and thinking) as well as minimizing emotional involvement. It can be claimed that, because of 
the aversion to feeling, the diagnosticians’ intuition is more ”intellectual intuition” rather than ”emotional intuition” 
and can be treated as a more objective criterion in decision making. In the diagnostic process. This method of data 
processing is connected to lthe engthening of the analysis, what confirms i.a. the tendency to search for missing 
information. In comparison to the other types, diagnosticians from this type quite rarely use classic heuristics rules 
except for availability heuristics. There were also found significant differences between declared frequency of 
referring to experience with similar patients and diagnostic strategies (1 and 2); ANOVA; F = 3,635, p = 0,03. 
However, for this type of diagnosticians, availability heuristics can play a different, non-specific for heuristics rules, 
role – it is a basis for generating further diagnostic hypotheses. 
Type 2. The second group consisted of persons (N = 27, that is 45 percent) who do not analyse much 
information and formulate a few diagnostic hypotheses. Because of these characteristics, this group is described as 
the  ”heuristic group”.  Unlike type 1, this group relied more on premises of life history and the subject than on 
premises of the examined persons' activities and the system, according to realization of the differential analysis 
method. Similarly to the premises, the group formulated mostly hypotheses concerning the examined persons' 
qualities (dispositions), then – fewer concerning emotions and behaviours, and the least – concerning the system. It 
can be concluded that the described strategy consists in minimizing diagnostic area. 
This diagnostician type is characterized by a dominant, global method of processing and organizing 
information, aiming at a deep and global understanding of the problems, their emotional analysis (dominant 
function: feeling) and the attitude towards personal (subjective) valuation, even at the cost of facts. In connection to 
the aversion to thinking function, it can be assumed that the intuition which is used by this group, is more emotional, 
therefore, it is a criterion that makes the decision-making process more subjective. In the diagnostic area, it appears 
as a tendency to heuristic thinking on the basis of a small amount of data. In comparison to the other types, these 
diagnosticians quite often use classical heuristic rules. Significant differences between using anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics (Chi2 = 16,173; p < 0,001) as well as representativeness heuristics (Chi2 = 11,675; p = 0,003) 
and used diagnostic strategies (1 and 2) were found. It is coherent with the fact that the representatives of this group, 
do not attach importance to psychological theories during diagnosis. Significant statistical differences between using 
psychological theory in diagnostic process and used diagnostic strategies (2 and 3) were indicated (Chi2 = 7,967; p 
= 0,019). Moreover, it can be claimed that using a foregoing strategy leads to relative effectiveness in diagnosis 
(about 20 per cent formulated the correct diagnosis). It should be emphasized, that despite lower accuracy, the 
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heuristic strategy economizes diagnosis (a big reduction of processed information and formulated hypothesis, 
minimal time needed to decide about a diagnosis). 
Type 3. The third profile consisted of the persons (N = 27, that is 45 percent) who analyse much data and 
formulate many diagnostic hypotheses (there were more rejected than positive hypotheses what can prove the 
minimizing of confirmation mistake). This strategy can be described as the ”mixed strategy” (precisely: analytic – 
heuristic).  This group considered premises about the system rather than the examined persons' activities, life and the 
subject history. Based on the premises, more hypotheses concerning the system than ones concerning the subject and 
qualities (these were the least numerous) were formulated. The content of the premises and the hypotheses was 
similar to that presented in type 1. It can be concluded that this strategy means avoiding reductionism in diagnosis 
but without a tendency to maximize diagnostic areas. 
The third type cannot be characterized by only one, dominant style of data processing. It can be supposed, 
that in this case, the general cognitive preferences do not have a great impact on the diagnostic process. Specific 
learned abilities, connected to the procedure in the diagnostic process, can play a greater role. During diagnosing, 
the diagnosticians analyse some of detailed facts, which are believed to be important, but they aim at information 
synthesis and finalizing the initial diagnosis at the same time. It is important that they use an objective criterion – a 
psychological theory – as a the basis for deduction. Using theory can be one of the factors that increase diagnosis 
accuracy in this group. They formulated relatively good diagnoses in comparison to the other types (about 35 
percent of good diagnoses). 
4. Implications and Applications 
Relying on the results shown in this study it can be concluded that the maximal diagnostic strategy is the 
least effective. Between the other two strategies – ”mixed” (analytic-heuristic) and heuristic – the differences in 
effectiveness are not big significant. The ”mixed” strategy was the most effective what can be explained in the 
following way – intuition allows for a fast matching of the information about an examined person with a particular 
diagnostic category, without a detailed differentiation. However, the formulated hypothesis can be wrong. The 
hypothesis can be verified by means of further research and reasoning (differential, eliminative). A diagnostician 
whose mind tends to use one dominant cognitive function can gather and process diagnostic data in a tendentious, 
and therefore ineffective, way.  
The presented results have practical implications for education in diagnosis, especially clinical diagnosis, in 
two areas: students of psychology education and further education (professional development) of psychologists. I 
would like to indicate some important directions of education: psychology students' orientation towards increasing 
their self-consciousness in the scope of their own cognitive preferences and tendencies to use particular diagnostic 
strategies: maximal, mixed (analytic-heuristic) or heuristic. In education of future psychologists-diagnosticians two 
aspects of diagnosis should also be taken into consideration: essential and formal-structural. The former is more 
emphasised during teaching diagnosis (also clinical diagnosis) than the latter. The results of this study can be used to 
change this situation. The knowledge about diagnostic strategies should be included into clinical subjects. It is also 
important that the most effective strategy is based on the analytic and heuristic data processing method. 
When it comes to the educational process, the case study method can be used to realize the presented goals. 
The Case study method is widely used in education (mainly at universities educating medical doctors, psychologists 
and lawyers). It improves many skills, such as: critical and creative thinking, seeing problems in their complex 
context, thinking about consequences of made decisions and thinking multilaterally about problems. When this 
method is used, the examined person (case study) seems to be more important than the way of processing/organizing 
the information by a diagnostician. I would like to strongly emphasise  that using this method allows not only for 
analysing the content connected to the examined person in clinical context but also for following a the method of 
diagnostic data processing. Moreover, it can help to develop the skills of making diagnostic decisions. Therefore, I 
would like to focus on the realization of an additional purpose of using case analysis in teaching diagnosis: not only 
acquiring knowledge of diagnostic abilities, on the basis of normative models, but also widening the self-
consciousness in the scope of the preferred diagnostic data processing method. Widening the psychology students' 
and psychologists' self-consciousness about using heuristic rules in diagnosis – their limits and positive aspects – 
can improve the quality of mental health services. 
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